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Motherhood and the Machine 
Miglena Nikolchina 
Sofia University 
By defining the human in terms of the capacity for revolt, Kristeva 
unavoidably touches upon issues of robotization, technology, and the 
virtual. The concepts of animal and machine, though they do appear 
occasionally and in important ways, are never at the focus of her inquiries 
and are absent in this text. Yet, these two concepts to a large extent define 
the field of contemporary philosophical debates of the human. These debates 
are marked, on the one hand, by the theoretical ramifications of anti-
humanism as it was handed down by 20th century French thought, and, on 
the other, by current scientific developments that intrude on the most 
intimate aspects of the human being as a living being. This second aspect is 
frequently perceived as insufficiently addressed by philosophy. It has been 
noted that the growing technological possibilities are devoid of a project due 
to the implosion of the political.1 It has been noted, too, that 
conceptualizations lag behind actual developments in this field.2 Yet it can 
also be argued that the specific solutions pursued by various approaches to 
the human are subtended by anxieties related to the juxtaposition of man 
and machine as we experience it today. 
Three major theoretical orientations seem to have emerged in response 
to these anxieties. On the one hand, there is the trend which tries to come to 
terms with technological novelties and the merging of human and machine, 
of “organic” and “synthetic” that they imply. This trend unfolds under the 
rubric of “transhuman” or “posthuman” and of the “enhancement” of man. 
Fascinated by the progress made in various fields from genetics and bionics 
to artificial intelligence, this trend takes for granted leaving the human 
behind. The second trend predominates in animal studies. Mostly in an 
ethical perspective but also ontologically, this trend, to which Derrida’s later 
writing made a significant contribution, questions the idea of the “human 
exception” and the rigorous distinction between man and animal on which 
this exception rests. While apparently antagonistic, both trends align the 
human with the animal (or “organic”) and oppose it to technology. The third 
trend collapses the distinctions on which the previous two rely through the 
lens of biopolitics: drawing on Heidegger, Kojève, and Foucault, it regards 
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contemporary technological transformations as amounting to the 
animalization of man.  The human disappears in the animal, in the machine, 
or in the indistinguishability of the two, confirming what Agamben has 
described as the inoperativeness of the anthropological machine. 
On a certain level these perspectives continue tackling Rene Descartes’ 
understanding of animals as automata identical to (safe for the complexity 
and smallness of the parts) manmade mechanisms.  In the 18th century this 
idea was philosophically extended to man by Julien Offray de La Mettrie in 
his treatise Man a Machine, while the famous French engineer and 
constructor of man and animal-like mechanisms Jacques de Vaucanson 
(born in the same year as La Mettrie, 1709) attempted to prove in practice, 
through his inventions, that there was no difference between organism and 
mechanism. And yet, the fascination his automata exerted on his 
contemporaries and, later on, on the romantics, facilitated a major paradox: 
what emerged from the Cartesian identification of animals as automata was 
the autonomization of the automaton, its subtraction from the biological. We 
can go back to Homer for the fantasy of automatoi, mechanical helpers that 
can function by themselves, but it is at this point, with this fissure of the 
Cartesian equation, that the automaton appears as opposed to the animal 
(and to what will take the form of various streaks of vitalism) and as man’s 
double, a rebellious rival, a challenge to man’s identity, and a harbinger of 
the uncanny: the very introduction of the concept of the uncanny by Freud 
appears with a reference to E.T.A. Hoffmann’s story “The Sandman” about a 
man falling in love, unawares, with an automaton.   
The crucial shift subtending the autonomization of the automaton is a 
shift from defining the human through the effort at transcending the animal 
(within) to the uncanny encounter with an artificial double subtracted from 
it. The human is not subsumed — by the animal, the machine, or their 
indifference, as the three perspectives discussed above would have it — but 
is subjected to a novel type of anthropological machine, one that works 
through Doppelgangers and the threat to identity that they present. In 
fiction, this shift unfolds as contestation and deadly struggle on the 
boundary separating the doubles. Already with Mary Shelley and Hoffmann 
the struggle ends in madness and destruction. Descartes’ legacy can be 
detected in Frankenstein’s fiasco as creator: he fails for the simple reason 
that he has to use unfittingly large parts, hence the fatally monstrous 
appearance of his creature. External monstrosity thus becomes the sign of 
the creature’s artificiality. The case with Hoffmann’s Olympia is more 
intricate: her artificiality becomes apparent only after a macabre scene of 
dismemberment. Still, this is a difference which shows through her “parts.” 
What if these parts become indistinguishable from the human? By the time 
we come to Philip K. Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep the problem 
has shifted: far from the glaring distinctness of Frankenstein’s Monster, but 
also of Olympia with her clockwork insides, the difference between artificial 
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and natural creatures has become extremely difficult to verify. What is still 
there, or even more so, is the threat, the hostility, the terror of an otherness 
which is not sufficiently other. The protagonist Rick Deckard (a transparent 
poke at Rene Descartes) has to perform the Cartesian operation of discerning 
the automaton from the human. He does so through psychological tests but 
also through plunging headlong into an all too human experience. Strangely 
for his dark and terrifyingly slippery anti-foundationalist vision, in the novel 
Dick provides a criterion for discernment (empathy marks the human). This 
is no longer the case in Ridley Scott’s film version Blade Runner and, in fact, 
reversals become possible such as the one in Alien 4: Resurrection where the 
protagonist Ripley, realizing that one of the characters is a droid, remarks: “I 
should have known. No human being is that humane.”3 
What risks getting lost if we ignore the subtraction of the automaton is 
that the subtraction brings about a significant transformation in the 
operation — rather than inoperativeness — of the anthropogenetic machine. 
Technically, the transformation involves a shift from a tragic and sublime to 
a comic or uncanny mode of defining the human.4 Revolt in the Kristevan 
sense is another aspect of this transformation. Why in the Kristevan sense? 
Because the point of total technological annihilation of the human is 
explored in its potential for infinite recreation. If tales of robots in so many 
cases are tales of revolt (machines against humans, humans against 
machines), this is because, in subtracting, the automaton subtracts the 
question of the human. “I revolt, therefore we are (to become human)” is the 
principle subtending these narratives where the artificial creature gathers 
like a lens the reminder that we are in so far as we are in revolt.5 If we so 
frequently wonder what all these riots and protests nowadays want — what 
are they against? What are they for? over and beyond nihilisms, 
fundamentalisms and sheer purposelessness — the answer might be 
precisely this, by remembering the potentialities of revolt to make sense in 
the face of the growing superfluousness of the human.  
In recent decades, however, there has been a further shift in robotic 
parables. Fictional artificial creatures are by definition motherless and 
fathered by science. Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein creates his Monster after 
ideologically parting ways with alchemy.  E.T.A. Hoffmann’s Olympia is the 
offspring of the nefarious alliance between a scientist (the physics professor 
Spalanzani) and a dark arts adept (the lawyer Coppelius/Coppola). These 
two troubling creations appear at almost the same time in two different 
languages and in different parts of Europe (Hoffmann’s short story “The 
Sandman” appeared in his collection Night Pieces in 1817; Frankenstein 
appeared in 1818; both works were conceived in 1816). Toward the close of 
the 19th century, Auguste Villiers de l'Isle-Adam’s The Future Eve (1886) 
introduced one of the key terms for designating artificial humans - android 
(“une andréide,” more precisely) - with an interesting twist. The “future Eve,” 
a perfect manmade woman is, once again, the product of a male scientist 
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whom Villiers de l'Isle-Adam chose to name after the “electrician” Thomas 
Edison. While The Future Eve is justifiably analyzed in terms of its blatant 
misogyny, it reiterates the deficiency of motherless procreation: the 
scientifically constructed artificial body is animated by some sort of occult 
femininity, Edison’s mysterious assistant. With Karel Čapek’s play R.U.R. 
(1920), which institutes the word robot, the brushes of science with the 
supernatural have been completely abandoned in favor of a male couple 
better fitting the times that are with us still: there is the scientist obsessed 
with his inventions and there is the capitalist whose only concern is profit. 
The marriage of science and business becomes the progenitor of robots as 
cheap artificial laborers whose rebellion brings about the destruction of the 
human race.  
From their inception these haunting narratives of manmade creatures 
explicitly foreground a competition between scientific and divine creation; 
yet it is obvious that the (male) scientific hubris aspires to replace female 
generative power. Knowingly or not, maternity is hence aligned with the 
divine. Its absence produces a shifting deficiency in the artificial creatures, 
which then becomes the force driving the plot: from oddly catastrophic 
ugliness (the Monster stitched together from parts that are too big because, 
as Descartes pointed out, man cannot compete in this respect with God’s 
machines) to incapacity for or lack of love, and to the Kantian problematic of 
choice and freedom powerfully and disturbingly introduced in Hoffmann’s 
“Sandman.”  
Later treatments of the theme accrue other issues (thinking, self-
reflexivity, loyalty, empathy, etc.): the significant change that emerges 
thought them is a re-conceptualization of the anthropological machine as 
discussed by Agamben. The anthropological machine, the machine which 
produces the human through differentiating it from the animal, whether 
projecting the animal on real animals and humans or not, presupposes an 
internal boundary that needs to be transcended. Tragedy is the proper mode 
of this transcendence. Transcending it — in and through death — creates the 
“blinding splendor” which Lacan notes in Antigone: if this amazing 
creature, man, is described by the chorus at the beginning of Sophocles’ 
tragedy as having conquered everything but death, by the end of the 
tragedy Antigone demonstrates that death can be turned into precisely what 
makes the human. The artificial creature, however, functions as a redoubling 
of the human that confronts it from outside. It thus stirs the risks and the 
destructive consequences of the uncanny, while never being very far from 
the structural possibilities of comedy.6  
One of the consequences of being motherless seems to be the lack of 
sexual love and reproduction: this issue is already brought forward in Mary 
Shelley’s novel. It is with Čapek’s R.U.R., however, that sexual love acquires 
the status of a proper passageway to the human: at the end of the play 
humanity is destroyed along with the formula for the robots’ production. 
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But two robotic models, more sophisticated than the rest, have fallen in love 
and convey the promise that they will become the Adam and Eve of a new 
beginning.  
With the stunning new advances in reproductive technology we might 
expect a decline in the enthusiasm regarding the divinity of natural 
procreation. As late as the 1970s, in “Motherhood according to Giovanni 
Bellini,” Julia Kristeva is still able to say that “science, despite its effective 
devices, acknowledges it cannot now and perhaps never will be able to take 
away [the process of gestation from the mother].”7 Today, we have to 
acknowledge that science will be able to do so. Furthermore, as Kristeva has 
recently noted, women seem to turn to assisted pregnancies without 
prejudice because, perhaps, “the pre-subjective side of feminine erotic 
familiarizes them with the loss of self which science imposes on the most 
intimate…” And yet — Kristeva adds — “feminine fertility and pregnancy 
not only continue to fascinate our collective imagination, but also serve as a 
sanctuary for the sacred. The position of modern religiosity would hold the 
“beyond” as no longer being above our heads but in the womb. Today 
motherhood is imbued with what has survived of religious feeling.”8  
This might explain the paradoxical state of affairs at the center of a 
powerful new rendition of the tale of rebellious robots, the 2003-2009 TV 
series “Battlestar Galactica.”9 An advanced civilization has been completely 
destroyed by its own creation, the “cylons.” A dwindling group of about 
50,000 survivors succeed to flee but are relentlessly pursued across the 
universe by “humanity’s children.” Initially metallic and machinelike, the 
cylons have meanwhile evolved to be practically indistinguishable from 
humans: they bleed, they sweat, they can feel, they have religious ideas and 
scientific preoccupations. What they cannot do is reproduce sexually and 
they are ready to go into any lengths to achieve this. Although the story 
reiterates many of the questions raised throughout the imaginative history 
of the artificial creature — free choice, sympathy, love, loyalty, sociality, the 
“need to believe and desire to know,” as well as propensity for philosophical 
questioning — it is sexual conception and mothering that turn out to be the 
most difficult task for the machines and hence become the node of violence, 
strife, complicity, and hope.  
Events in the saga are hence ultimately driven by the cylons’ ambition 
to bring about “the face of the shape of things to come,” a new generation of 
“God’s children,” a hybrid race of humans and machines. The question is 
why? Why should this new race be the offspring of sexual conception and 
natural gestation and, besides, why should this turn out to be more difficult 
than other human things, be they physical or spiritual? Why go through a 
gestating maternal body? These questions, in fact, are raised in the film by a 
cylon who is against this plan. Says Brother Cavil:  
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I saw a star explode and send out the building blocks of 
the Universe. Other stars, other planets and eventually 
other life. A supernova! Creation itself! I was there. I 
wanted to see it and be part of the moment. And you 
know how I perceived one of the most glorious events in 
the universe? With these ridiculous gelatinous orbs in my 
skull! With eyes designed to perceive only a tiny fraction 
of the EM spectrum. With ears designed only to hear 
vibrations in the air. […] I don't want to be human! I want 
to see gamma rays! I want to hear X-rays! And I want to - I 
want to smell dark matter! Do you see the absurdity of 
what I am? I can't even express these things properly 
because I have to - I have to conceptualize complex ideas 
in this stupid limiting spoken language! But I know I want 
to reach out with something other than these prehensile 
paws! And feel the wind of a supernova flowing over me! 
I'm a machine! And I can know much more! I can 
experience so much more. But I'm trapped in this absurd 
body! And why? Because my five creators thought that 
God wanted it that way!10  
Even if we leave aside the social and political circumstances which align 
robotic rebellion with the contemporary malady of ideality, the question still 
remains what makes female fertility so central in the face of conflicting 
scientific and technological facts? What makes it so vital and so crucially 
desirable that a science fiction saga played out against the background of 
exploding supernovas and galactic expanses of space revolves around it? 
One of the episodes (“The Farm”) offers a now familiar fantasy of abject 
female bodies immobilized and deformed by “science”- by the cylons’ 
experimentation to achieve a hybrid, human-machine fetus through 
technological means. According to the creators of the series, it won’t do. It 
will take love: in terms very similar to Čapek’s R.U.R. Yet in or outside of 
the presumptuousness of science we know love is not a case here: 
pregnancies will result from rape or sheer carelessness; today, they will take 
place in vitro and through surrogate motherhood; sooner rather than later, 
an all the way artificial womb will be achieved. So whence the tenacity of 
placing the “beyond” in the womb which surprisingly emerges in the 
fantasy of the pregnant machine? 
Returning to Kristeva, one might note that motherhood is in any case an 
“impossible syllogism,” a biosocial module where different codes and 
programs clash, a meeting point of the alien and the machine. “Within the 
body, growing as a graft, indomitable, there is an other.”11 There is not and 
cannot be a subject in this “process of cells, molecules, and atoms 
accumulating, dividing, and multiplying;” in this place where a mother 
becomes her own mother, where they become the same continuity 
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differentiating itself. This homosexual facet of motherhood, which is part of 
woman’s specific double-faced and double-phased Oedipus, is properly 
speaking subjectless and hence complicit, as already pointed out, with the 
objectivity of scientific intrusion into the most intimate. To presume that 
there is a subject in this place, would take us to religion. To utterly evacuate 
the possibility of a subject being there, however, would lead to instability 
and the threat of psychosis. It is out of motherhood as this impossible cleft 
that the future subject is transposed to the dramas of maternal passion and 
maternal reliance, which threaten and warrant its existence as a creature 
capable of resisting its programming, a creature in revolt.12 
What pregnant machines and robotic children subtract has, therefore, 
been with us for a long time. It is the process that spreads from the 
multiplying of cells and the clash of conflicting codes to the wagers of being 
a creature without fixed identity, a creature whose identity has to be 
constantly re-made. Machines need to be mothered: thus and only thus, 
those parables tell us, the subtraction of the human, which the automaton 
performs, will perpetuate the question of humanity’s renewal. To put it 
differently: if the question posed by artificial creatures is “what does it mean 
to be human?”, the answer provided by recent fables and supported by 
Kristeva’s theoretical ramifications would be that the human is this type of 
machine which has partaken of maternal passion. 
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